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PREFACE 
This publication is prepared under a collaborative research 
project concerning rural finance in the Philippines. The principal 
collaborating institutions are the Philippine Institute for Devel-
opment studies (PIDS), the Agricultural Credit Policy Council 
(ACPC), and the International Rice Research Institute (IRR!). OSU 
participation is funded by the USAID Mission in the Philippines and 
the Bureau of Science and Technology, AID, Washington. The views 
expressed in these publications are those of the authors and may 
not be shared by any of the collaborating or sponsoring institu-
tions. 
RURAL FINANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES: 
AN UPDATE 
Richard L. Meyer1 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief update on 
major developments in rural finance in the Philippines, and to 
identify priority issues that remain in the development of sound, 
self-sustaining rural financial markets in the country. It is 
written as an update to my earlier paper "Rural Finance in the 
Philippines: Recent Changes and Priority Issues" prepared in June 
1987. In that paper, it was noted that the environment for the 
reform of rural financial markets had substantially improved com-
pared to the situation of just a few months earlier. Since then, 
a number of favorable developments have occurred, but there are 
also some troubling signs. The formal elements of the rural finan-
cial system still have a long way to go before we can be assured 
that a sound system is really in the process of being developed. 
Furthermore, there is still much to be learned about the informal 
system which continues to be the chief source of financial services 
for the poorest rural households. 
1I am indebted to several people who provided information used 
to develop the ideas presented in this paper, especially Emmanuel 
Esguerra, Mario Lamberte, Gilbert Llanto, and Bruce Tolentino. The 
usual disclaimers apply. 
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KEY DEVELOPMBN'l'S 
Major Financial Reforms 
One of the most important trends in recent months has been 
the change noted in Central Bank policy with respect to its fun-
damental role regarding rural finance. For almost two decades the 
Central Bank had employed an aggressive policy of allocating finan-
cial resources towards the agricultural sector. To accomplish this 
goal, it stimulated the growth of Rural Banks, subsidized agri-
cultural loans, employed quotas to expand rural lending of the 
banking system, offered rediscounting to expand the liquidity of 
banks making approved agricultural loans, and engaged in detailed 
management of lending to farmers and the operations of the Rural 
Banks. These policies were given major importance with the rice 
shortages of the early 1970s in the form of Masagana 99, but were 
subsequently expanded into a variety of targeted lending programs. 
Al though this strategy may have contributed to an expansion in 
agricultural output, the costs have been high2 • It undermined the 
Rural Banks, the very ins ti tut ions it was designed to help by 
destroying their incentives to engage in sound rural financial 
intermediation, and saddled many of them with a large portfolio of 
uncollected loans3 • Several of the bigger institutions avoided 
these problems and the agricultural loan quotas, however, by 
2Sacay, Agabin and Tanchoco summarize some of the evidence 
about the extent to which Masagana 99 really contributed to 
expanding rice production. 
3Many banks contributed to their own problems, of course, by 
eagerly participating in the strategy. 
3 
choosing the alternative of investing in government obligations 
rather than expanding loans, thereby thwarting the intended policy 
but preserving their financial integrity. The strategy destroyed 
the credit ratings of thousands of Filipino farmers who to this 
day have not repaid the loans they were encouraged to take during 
this period, and created the bad precedence of suggesting that 
government directed loans could be treated as grants rather than 
loans to be repaid. 
The Central Bank is now moving away from a resource allocation 
role and is assuming more of the traditional central bank role of 
managing the money supply, controlling inflation and assuring the 
public of the safety and stability of the financial system4 • Inter-
est rate controls have been relaxed to create more incentives to 
lend, and market forces are intended to be used to establish inter-
est rate levels. Several government agencies are funding guarantee 
programs to reduce the lenders' perception of the riskiness of 
lending to certain clientele. A major related change was the 
creation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) which 
merged twenty out of the forty-six separate loan funds for the 
commodity programs previously implemented by the Department of 
Agriculture. CALF funds are now being used to guarantee loans made 
under four programs: Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation, Guar-
antee Fund of Small and Medium Enterprises, Quedan Guarantee Fund 
Board, and Bagong Pagkain ng Bayan (guarantee funds for loans to 
4Another major role of the Central Bank beyond the scope of 
this paper is the management of the country's large foreign debt. 
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local government units). Although there are pressures to reduce 
interest rates and expand credit supplies for priority sectors, 
including agriculture, the Central Bank is no longer viewed as the 
agency to advocate these policies nor implement them through finan-
cial policies. The significance of this fundamental change should 
not be overlooked as we discuss the large number of things that 
still remain to be done to develop rural financial markets. 
Another major development in rural finance was the intro-
duction of the Rural Bank Rehabilitation Program after years of 
discussion about what to do with the Rural Banks that failed or 
were failing because they could not service the debts incurred 
through participation in past government credit programs. ACPC data 
show that as of December 31, 1988, 522 banks had applied for par-
ticipation and 476 had been approved. Of the approved banks, 295 
had fully complied with program requirements and 53 had partially 
complied. With the infusion of additional equity capital, these 
banks should be on the road to recovery and should resume providing 
financial services in their local market areas. With appropriate 
training and supervision, the problems which caused their downfall 
should be avoided in the future. 
Planned Financial Reforms 
The recently signed Letter of Intent with the IMF suggests 
that a number of additional reforms will be implemented to further 
deregulate and strengthen the financial system which will have 
implications for rural financial markets. These include: 
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1. Strengthen the legal framework for bank supervision. 
2. Improve depositor protection by enlarging the role and 
strengthening the Philippines Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (PDIC). 
3. Improve competition in banking including removing 
restrictions on the opening of new rural branches by 
qualified institutions. 
4. Reduce intermediation costs by phasing out over the 
medium term the 20 percent withholding tax on interest 
income of financial savings and the gross receipts tax 
on financial institutions. 
5. Continue transferring responsibility for supervising 
most agricultural credit programs to the Department of 
Agriculture, including the transfer of the World Bank and 
AID-funded Agricultural Loan Fund. 
6. Continue the policy of establishing market-oriented 
interest rates for government-sponsored credit programs. 
If these changes are in fact implemented, they will help 
contribute to a favorable environment in which rural financial 
markets can develop. 
REMAINING ISSUES 
The discussion above suggested that several major developments 
either already implemented or planned will remove the primary 
remaining obstacles preventing the development of rural financial 
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markets. There are several reasons, however, that make us less 
sanguine that the essential preconditions are in place. The recent 
"rice crisis" provides a good example of just how quickly the clock 
could be turned back on policy reform. The emergency importation 
of rice and the demand for the introduction of price controls on 
key commodities may be an appropriate short-term response to a 
crisis affecting the most important item in the consumer consump-
tion basket, especially of low income households. However, 
experience in other countries shows how difficult it is to remove 
interventions that reduce food prices and allow the market to once 
again determine price levels. Yet it may be that higher prices are 
eventually needed to stimulate the investments that will lead to 
long-term food security. And higher rice prices may be essential 
if small rice farmers are to become attractive customers for finan-
cial institutions. Furthermore, there were some suggestions during 
the crisis that the country needed another subsidized Masagana 99-
type program to spur rice production. Thus it appears that the 
disastrous lessons of the past are not universally understood and 
that sound rural financial policies may be subordinate to low rice 
prices. This experience also suggests that the country's rural 
development-led economic strategy could be easily sabotaged if it 
fails to meet the short-term food needs of vocal urban interests. 
Another recent development with great implications for rural 
financial markets was the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Program(CARP). It represents many potential opportunities 
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and challenges for the financial system5 • On the one hand, demands 
are being made that agrarian reform beneficiaries should be granted 
loans and, in fact, the program could result in many potential new 
customers for banking services. This raises the question of the 
appropriate retail and/or combination of wholesale/retail arrange-
ments to meet this demand. On the other hand, there are serious 
questions about the capacity and willingness of the financial 
system to supply these services. Generally, agrarian reform bene-
ficiaries are considered to be poor credit risks. Their repayment 
records have been poor. They have collateral problems because the 
land they receive is already mortgaged for the amortization pay-
ments. Politically it may be difficult to take legal action 
against this class of borrowers if they default. Uncertainty about 
the sequencing of reform, possible exempted areas or enterprises, 
retention limits, valuation of land currently mortgaged for loans, 
etc. may discourage lenders, and there seems to be some evidence 
that some have already begun to demand urban land as collateral for 
agricultural loans. 
The balance of this section includes a discussion of several 
specific issues that demand attention because of their impact on 
the future development of rural financial markets. 
5several issues concerning the financing of agrarian reform 
were discussed in papers presented at the workshop-conference on 
"Credit and the CARP" held March 2-3,1989 at the Central Bank. 
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Rural Banks and their Rehabilitation 
The Rural Banks will play an important role in determining 
the extent to which formal institutions can serve the financial 
needs of rural households, especially small farmers, the landless, 
and the poor. Because they are small, are located close to rural 
residents, and have easier access to their customers, the Rural 
Banks have a potential advantage over other types of financial 
institutions. As such they may be able to incorporate into their 
lending decisions factors other than loan collateral in the form 
of physical assets. A rural banker, who had spent all her life in 
the rural town where her bank is located, recently revealed that 
she knew all 10,000 farm borrowers and 500 nonfarm borrowers of her 
bank. Although this may be an unusual case, it demonstrates the 
information advantage that a rural banker can have compared to the 
manager of a larger institution who may be from outside the com-
munity and may be transferred to a new branch every few years. 
Unfortunately, the situation of and prospects for the Rural 
Banks are quite unclear for several reasons. The traditional 
wisdom is that the strong Rural Banks were founded before the 
advent of government-directed lending programs or were able to 
avoid the pressure to participate in them. There is some empirical 
evidence to support that claim. But it is not clear if the new 
terms and conditions for agricultural lending are adequate to 
stimulate them to aggressively make farm loans. In spite of the 
guarantee programs, there is still great concern about the risk-
iness of agriculture. The fact remains that a large proportion of 
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the agricultural population is poor in both assets and income, and 
by definition has a limited capacity to borrow and pay back large 
loans. Therefore, access to loans is likely to occur through a 
slow build-up of confidence with a banker that will develop 
through, first, a deposit relationship followed by borrowing and 
successfully repaying a small loan. Deposit services are, there-
fore, the most crucial service that a banker can offer if formal 
loans are to become available to the poor. Helping Rural Banks 
develop cost-effective methods to mobilize and manage a large 
number of small deposit accounts is still a need. Current exper-
iments with microcomputers may suggest ways to reduce the adminis-
trative cost of these accounts. Attention is also required to the 
need to provide real rates of return to depositors in an environ-
ment in which inflationary expectations are rising. 
There have been few new Rural Banks licensed in recent years. 
The negative economic climate in rural areas has obviously con-
strained the demand for licenses. But it also appears that the 
Central Bank has been overly concerned in its ·licensing policy 
about excessive competition in local markets. The acquisition of 
a few failed banks by stronger ones may have been an effective way 
of helping resolve the failed bank problem, but at the expense of 
reducing competition. The situation today is that about half of 
the municipios in the country do not have even one banking office. 
This hardly represents overbanking. In the new climate of deregul-
ation and competition, it is important to facilitate the opening 
of new branches and the licensing of more Rural Banks. Competition 
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among banks is needed in order to stimulate the supply of a greater 
variety of financial services and drive down the costs of these 
services in rural areas. Central Bank policies need to be reviewed 
on this important matter. The decision to open a bank or branch 
should rest heavily on the profit calculations of the banking 
entrepreneurs who are prepared to risk their capital on the ven-
ture. The availability of expanded insurance to protect depositors 
should encourage the Central Bank to license more rural banks and 
branches, and let more of the risk of overbanking rest with the 
bankers6 • 
It is too early to determine if the Rehabilitation Program is 
having the desired effects. The large number of banks utilizing 
it suggests it is providing them with a way out of their difficult 
problems. The long-term issue is whether or not this new oppor-
tunity will permit them to actually strengthen themselves. A 
recent conversation with a banker in the Program from Pangasinan 
suggests that deposit mobilization and loan collection drives are 
having good results in improving the viability of the bank. A 
monitoring program needs to be put in place to determine if this 
positive result is being experienced elsewhere. The recent request 
by bankers to stretch out or restructure their obligations suggests 
that they are still trying to negotiate a better set of terms 
rather than get on with the business of rural intermediation. The 
worst thing that could happen to the Program now would be for 
6ACPC presented an analysis of rural banking issues in "Bank 
Entry and Expansion and the Availability of Banking Services". 
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additional easy money to be dumped into the banks before careful 
deposit mobilization and lending programs are put in place. 
The supervisory roles of the Central Bank and PDIC will be 
crucial in preventing Rural Bank failure in the future. Their role 
in this important function will need to be strengthened. The proce-
dures used to identify weaknesses in banks early enough so correc-
tive action can be taken will also need to be reviewed. The recent 
two studies on bank early warning models by Llanto and Vergara 
represent the type of analysis that is needed. 
The Expanded Role of the Land Bank of the Philippines 
No rural financial institution has undergone more change in 
orientation in the past year or so than the Land Bank. During its 
history, it avoided the financial problems encountered by other 
rural lenders by limiting its exposure in agriculture and making 
sufficient income from nonagricultural activities to subsidize the 
potential high losses arising from a large portfolio of overdue 
agrarian reform loans. Besides the need to resolve these problem 
loans, the Land Bank has begun to help rehabilitate some of the 
Rural Banks, implement a much expanded agrarian reform, and 
administer other government lending programs. It is in the 
process of a major expansion in new staff and field offices to 
handle these tasks. There are also proposals to turn the Land Bank 
into an apex bank for agriculture. Recognizing its limitations as 
a credit retailer, it is encouraging farmers to form groups and 
cooperatives in order to jointly borrow from the Bank. It is also 
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working with Rural Banks by participating in the financing of large 
farm loans and in developing liquidity funds to help participating 
Rural Banks in periods of financial stress. 
Several observations have been made about the wisdom and 
implications of the Land Bank assuming these major added respon-
sibilities7. One is that it is useful to have government programs 
concentrated in one strong financial institution8 that has the 
integrity to demand financial discipline and that will require that 
subsidies be made explicit and transparent. Another is that even 
a strong institution like the Land Bank is over-extending itself 
and will not be able to provide quality service in all the areas 
in which it is becoming involved. Yet another view is that the 
Bank has not solved the problem of financing past agrarian reform 
beneficiaries on a viable basis and is likely to permit the spread 
of loan delinquency and default to the CARP beneficiaries. An even 
more negative view is that the formation of farmer groups to 
receive loans will result in the repetition of the previous bad 
group lending experience in the Philippines in which group dynamics 
as frequently led to group nonrepayment as to repayment. It is 
further argued that the Bank will eventually succumb to pressure 
and become an easy rediscount window for participating Rural and 
other banks . Furthermore, a bad repayment record by agrarian 
7 Some of these issues were discussed in the workshop-con-
f erence on "Credit and the CARP" and in the paper by Kern, et.al. 
8As evidence that the Land Bank is perceived as a strong 
institution, the Department of Agriculture recently selected it to 
implement the Integrated Rural Financing Program(IRF). 
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reform beneficiaries could "contaminate" other rural borrowers so 
good banks would reduce their agricultural portfolios and leave 
the sector worse off than it is today. 
A careful research program needs to be mounted to assess these 
issues· and contribute to policy formation so that the sad rural 
finance experience of the past will not be repeated. This research 
will also help identify the reasons why lenders are hesitant to 
lend to agrarian reform beneficiaries. 
Informal Finance 
Traditionally, the informal financial sector has not been 
viewed as playing a positive role in providing financial services. 
That perspective is being challenged because of the recent research 
reports prepared by Adams and Sandoval, Agabin, et.al., Armenia, 
Floro, Geron, Lamberte, Larson and others. These reports show the 
wide variety of informal financial arrangements that exist, the 
large number of households that utilize informal finance, the 
complex set of reasons for utilizing these services, and the dif-
ficulty that exists in concluding whether or not informal finance 
represents an important service to be nurtured or an undesirable 
substitute for formal finance that will disappear when the formal 
system improves and penetrates further into rural areas. 
The significance of the informal sector in rural areas was 
once again revealed in the preliminary results of a recent careful 
ACPC survey of 4 villages in Nueva Ecija in which 171 sampled 
households were interviewed regarding the wet and dry seasons of 
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1987/88. Unlike many agricultural studies, this survey included 
both farm and nonfarm households. Of the total sample, 140 house-
holds reported borrowing in one or both seasons and they reported 
a total of 597 loan contracts. Only 30 (5%) contracts were with 
banks and cooperatives, and only 14 involved mortgaging cultivation 
rights as collateral. Traders were the most important source of 
the 567 informal contracts, followed in importance by landowners. 
Just under half (248) of the total contracts were between persons 
considered friends and relatives. 
Whether or not because of need or greater ingenuity, the 
informal sector is succeeding in providing loans to rural house-
holds on a scale that the formal sector cannot match. All too 
frequently, however, the objective of financial policy has been to 
expand the formal system and impose its standard norms and proce-
dures on a rural economic and social system that may be quite 
inhospitable at this stage of development. The most obvious prob-
lem is that formal finance relies heavily on loan collateral to 
screen customers and reduce the probability of loan loss. Land is 
by far the most readily accepted collateral in any rural financial 
system in the world. Yet a significant proportion of rural resi-
dents in the Philippines are landless, and a large proportion of 
farmers rent all or most of the land they operate. Guarantee 
programs and other forms of collateral substitutes acceptable to 
formal finance have not been universally successful in resolving 
the problem. Yet the informal sector finds a way to successfully 
provide financial services in spite of this problem. This suggests 
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that the informal system has some advantages that need to be better 
understood. Perhaps some of these advantages can be adopted or 
mimicked by the formal system, or perhaps the formal system in its 
current form will always be stunted and operate at a disadvantage 
until the appropriate environment is in place. In the meantime, 
it is important that financial policies are not pursued with the 
objective of eliminating informal finance. 
The researchers who are trying to improve our understanding 
of informal finance and the implications for financial policy need 
to be given as much support and encouragement in their challenging 
task as the researchers of the formal system. They face the addi t-
ional problem that the data they need is most difficult and expen-
sive to obtain and the methodologies for analysis are not as well 
developed. 
Rural Nonf arm Enterprises 
Most of the attention on rural finance in the Philippines is 
directed toward agricultural credit, and most specifically toward 
production credit for farmers. There is little recognition of the 
fact that the success of agriculture is often directly tied to the 
performance of many types of nonfarm enterprises located in rural 
areas. These enterprises provide inputs and services essential to 
farm production and they process and market that production. In 
the process, they furnish primary or secondary employment to mem-
bers of farm households, particularly for landless households. 
This employment occurs on farms as household members engage in 
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handicraft and other activities during periods of slack labor 
demand for farm enterprises. Employment also occurs off the farm 
as household members hire out their labor on neighboring farms and 
in villages and small towns (Llanto, Villegas, and Octavio). 
The financial characteristics and needs of rural non farm 
enterprises are not well understood. In some cases, these enter-
prises undoubtedly generate income that is used to finance consump-
tion and production inputs on farms. In this way, they augment 
household liquidity and serve as substitutes for borrowing. In 
other cases, these enterprises require their own operating capital 
so that loans provided by formal and informal sources help lubri-
cate their production activities and expand their output. 
Because of the fungibility of funds, it is likely that loans 
provided to farm households for agricultural production have helped 
finance their nonfarm enterprises. Some loan funds have undoubt-
edly substituted for a household's own funds which have then been 
diverted to nonfarm enterprises. When loans are targeted only for 
agricultural enterprises, however, it is more difficult for entre-
preneurs to finance nonfarm enterprises which may generate a higher 
rate of return. There is always some risk of detection if funds 
are diverted to purposes other than intended so entrepreneurs 
engage in unproductive activities to cover up the actual use of 
loans. 
The needs of and opportunities for providing financial ser-
vices to nonfarm enterprises must become part of policymaker con-
• 
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cerns about rural financial market policy9 • Rural financial 
institutions need to be assisted to understand the role that non-
farm enterprises play in the farm household, their contribution to 
household cash flow, and therefore their importance in improving 
household creditworthiness. These enterprises also offer financial 
institutions new opportunities for savings mobilization and for 
diversification of loan portfolios. By providing services to these 
enterprises, they will indirectly support the agricultural sector. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper summarized many recent key developments affecting 
rural financial markets in the Philippines, and identified several 
important issues requiring additional attention. These include 
the Rural Banks and their rehabilitation, the sharply expanded 
rural financial role being assumed by the Land Bank of the Philip-
pines, the significant role of informal finance in rural areas, and 
the need for more attention to the needs of and opportunities for 
financal services for rural nonfarm enterprises. In addition, it 
was noted that the recent rice crisis shows how quickly financial 
reforms could be undercut, and how CARP has at once created in-
creased opportunities for rural lending and increased risks and 
uncertainty for rural lenders. 
9The current review of government livelihood programs provides 
an opportunity to assess the appropriate strategy for use in stimu-
lating rural nonfarm enterprises. 
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There is no question that policy changes during the past few 
years have created a better environment in the Philippines for 
developing viable, self-sustaining rural financial markets. But 
there are also many pressures to revert to past policies of sub-
sidizing interest rates and targeting loans in order to meet the 
interests and needs of particular groups. To preserve and extend 
the benefits of financial reform requires a strong program of rural 
finance research, plus an equally strong program of education to 
help policymakers appreciate the danger of adopting policies that 
on the surface appear to meet short-term needs, but of implemented 
would in effect undo much of the progress achieved in recent 
reforms. 
• 
.. 
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